Standing Committee B

[Mr. Eric Forth in the Chair]

Violent Crime Reduction Bill

Clause 2 - Orders on an application to magistrates' court

Amendment proposed [this day]: No. 12, in clause 2, page 2, line 32, leave out '16' and insert '18'.—[Mr. Malins.] 
Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

Eric Forth: I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following amendments: No. 170, in clause 2, page 2, line 32, leave out '16' and insert '15'.
No. 121, in clause 6, page 5, line 15, leave out subsections (8) and (9). 
No. 125, in clause 10, page 8, line 1, after 'person', insert 
'aged 18 years and above'. 
No. 126, in clause 10, page 8, line 3, at end insert— 
'(2A) A person of 16 or 17 years of age guilty of an offence under subsection (1) shall be liable, on conviction in the youth court, to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale.'. 
No. 29, in clause 10, page 8, line 22, leave out subsection (8). 
No. 30, in clause 10, page 8, line 26, leave out subsection (9).

Lynne Featherstone: As I was saying, amendment No. 121 deals with age, as do amendments Nos. 125 and 126, and the lead amendment, No. 12. Clause 10(9)(a) removes reporting restrictions. Even though at that stage the proceedings would not be criminal, there should be a presumption that the spirit of the United Nations convention on the rights of the child will be observed. We need to think carefully about how such matters should be publicised, because it is obvious that licensees, the police and interested parties such as youth offending teams will need to know who has received a drinking banning order, otherwise there would be no enforcement—which I have been keen on demanding today. It would not be appropriate for such publicity to stray into public notices in newspapers, leaflets through doors or anything like that. At the very least, it should be restricted to the categories that I mentioned. We tabled the amendment to establish the Government's intentions with regard to publicising the names and photographs of children—albeit that 16 and 17-year-olds are a particular category of children, who need a lot of observation.
My other concern, and another reason for the amendment, is that publication will do little to discourage 16 and 17-year-olds from such behaviour.  There is an added danger that it would become a badge of honour, as has happened with some antisocial behaviour orders, and that drinking banning orders would become a sort of status symbol, particularly because drinking is sometimes regarded as being a macho occupation. Young people may well compete with each other. 
It would be improper to breach the spirit of the UN convention, and there may be an anomaly in that a 16-year-old accused of breaching an ASBO can be identified in the media, but one accused of murder cannot. We need to clear this matter up so that the law is consistently protective. 
As for amendment No. 125, there is still potential for offenders to be sent to prison if they persistently and wilfully breach their community sentences—

Hazel Blears: Perhaps I can help the hon. Lady. A Government amendment has been tabled to clause 10, which would remove the custodial penalty for breaching a drinking banning order. Therefore, the hon. Lady's amendment may not be necessary.

Lynne Featherstone: I thank the Minister for that information. I recognise that the Government amendment will remove prison sentences—obviously, my party totally supports that. However, my understanding is that a custodial sentence would still apply in cases of persistent and wilful breach—but perhaps my assumption is wrong. Amendment No. 126 covers much the same ground, as there is still a potential prison sentence for repeated offences.

Hazel Blears: The hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) said that his amendment No. 12, which seeks to raise to 18 the age at which drinking banning orders can apply, and his amendment No. 170, which seeks to reduce it to 15, are intended to probe the reason for setting the age at 16. Perhaps I can help him.
The alcohol harm reduction strategy identified people aged 16 to 24 as more likely than any other age group to binge drink. The highest alcohol consumption takes place between the ages of 16 and 24. For alcohol-related assaults against adults, offenders generally tended to be 16 or older. For alcohol-related stranger assaults, 60 per cent. of offenders were 16 to 24, and 38 per cent. were 25 or older. Clearly, we had to decide on an age at which the drinking banning order will apply, and there is a fair evidence base for saying that 16 is the appropriate age. 
We did not want to set 18 as the age, as under-age drinkers would not be caught by the provisions. That is one of the main mischiefs at which the legislation aims. Nor did we want to go as low as 15, as there is a distinction between drinking banning orders and antisocial behaviour orders. ASBOs can apply to everybody over 10, and drinking banning orders come in at 16, which we think is appropriate. I hope that that reassures the hon. Gentleman sufficiently for him not to press what he admitted were probing amendments. 
Amendment No. 29, to which the hon. Gentleman did not refer, would remove the right of a relevant authority to appoint a person to be present at the  youth court, but that is an important provision. It is right that someone from, say, social services or a youth offending team ought to be present at a youth court when it is dealing with someone who is young and vulnerable. Again, I ask the hon. Gentleman not to press the amendment. 
Amendments Nos. 30 and 121, to which the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green (Lynne Featherstone) spoke, seek to re-impose automatic reporting restrictions on proceedings for an order on conviction or for a breach. The Bill lifts the automatic reporting restrictions but does not say that the court cannot ever restrict reporting. It says that it is a matter for the court, which will consider the circumstances as a whole, to decide whether there ought to be reporting of an order or a penalty imposed for a breach. The press may be allowed to report local cases. 
Again, as with antisocial behaviour orders, it is absolutely right and proper in some cases that the community should know whether orders have been made or breached, so that they can help with enforcement. If they see someone going into an area from which he or she is excluded by order, they can report that to the police so that swift action can be taken. The hon. Lady said that she wanted rigorous enforcement of the orders. In that case, the community should help the police with the enforcement agenda. I hope that she will think carefully before pursuing the amendments, which would mean that in many cases the community would not know who was subject to an order or whether it had been breached. It is right that the court should have the discretion to consider such issues on a case-by-case basis. We are reversing the current presumption; we are not preventing the court from making such decisions. 
The hon. Member for Woking said that he was concerned about under-age drinking. We ran an important campaign about the many things that shops, off-licences and clubs can do to establish proof of age. The PASS hologram, under the proof of age standards scheme, is difficult to replicate, whether on the internet or any other way. I stress that it is important that people who sell alcohol should make an effort to determine whether the people to whom they are selling are of an age at which they can legally obtain alcohol. 
 I am a little surprised that the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green does not want any publicity about young people in such circumstances. It has been brought to our attention that members of her party have indicated that they want the legal age for drinking to be reduced to 16. I am not sure whether the hon. Lady shares that position—it would be interesting if she could put that on the record for us today—but we think that when young people are drinking under the legal age, the courts should be able to publicise that fact. On those grounds, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Humfrey Malins: The purpose of my amendment was to tease out from the Minister why she thought that 16 was the appropriate age. I tried to draw attention to excess drinking by 15-year-olds. The Minister has told us of the reasoning behind her decision to go for 16,  which I understand, and it has been a useful debate, and I shall withdraw my amendment.

Lynne Featherstone: I am still concerned about the presumption being switched round for 16 and 17-year-olds, when enforcement could be adequately carried out by the authorities. There is a danger here, and we shall need to explore it further in future.

Humfrey Malins: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 15, in clause 2, page 2, line 41, leave out subsection (4).

Eric Forth: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
No. 31, in clause 11, page 9, line 11, leave out paragraph (c). 
No. 32, in clause 11, page 9, line 15, leave out from ''section 8;'' to end of line 24. 
Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
On resuming—

Humfrey Malins: As I was saying, amendment No. 15 is a probing amendment, which would omit subsection (4). I seek to find out from the Minister what the Bill means when it states that
''a relevant authority must consult the appropriate persons.''
That could take a long time. A ''relevant authority'' means a local authority or a police authority. Appropriate persons are the police or the local authority. So, if someone decides to apply to the magistrates court to take out a drinking banning order, they must consult first. I want to know how long that will take. If the police have to consult the local authority—the Bill says consult rather than notify—the local authority will presumably be required to consider the application, comment thereon and return the papers to the police, who are making the application. Will that require committee meetings of the local authority—they only meet once in a six or eight week cycle—or will it be an officer-led decision? Will a letter of say-so from the chief officer of the local authority, his having been consulted, be satisfactory? That is the only purpose of the probing amendment.

Lynne Featherstone: There seems to be an oddity. In clause 11, county councils are given a role in drinking banning orders, but district councils are not where a county council exists. But in clause 17, the situation is the other way round. Will the Minister clarify that?

Hazel Blears: I am not sure whether I can help the hon. Lady in that amount of detail at present, but I will certainly consider her point and give her the information. The intention of the Bill is to make the crime and disorder reduction partnership, which is usually at district council level, the area where partnership working takes place to tackle alcohol misuse and the violence that ensues. 
The hon. Member for Woking has used his amendments to make the case that consultation will mean that the process will take an inordinate amount of time. I reassure him that partnership working between local authorities and the police is pretty well established. I am sure that it is in his area, as it is in mine. Under antisocial behaviour legislation, local authorities and the police have to agree on antisocial behaviour orders and dispersal orders. They are used to working in that way. In practical terms, that usually means that the chief superintendent, being the borough commander, will discuss the matter with, perhaps, the chief executive of the local authority and reach an agreement. 
It is important that the local authority and the police work together to tackle alcohol-related crime. Some of the best schemes for reducing alcohol misuse involve the local council and the police coming together to set up city-centre safe schemes, such as the one in Manchester. There are schemes in Swansea, Newcastle, Leeds and Leicester. They are very much a partnership between local authorities and the police. In considering making an application for a drinking banning order, joint working is right, because both agencies may clearly need to have an input. I hope that that is sufficient reassurance for the hon. Gentleman, and I ask him to withdraw his amendment.

Humfrey Malins: It is indeed and, on that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 13, in clause 2, page 2, line 44, after 'proved', insert 'to the criminal standard'.

Eric Forth: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 171, in clause 2, page 2, line 44, after 'proved', insert 'beyond reasonable doubt'.

Humfrey Malins: This is an important point of principle. My amendment merely seeks to ensure that when a court finds it proved that conditions were satisfied and can make a drinking banning order the proof should be ''to the criminal standard'', not to the civil standard. That would ensure that the magistrates must be sure—the previous phrase was ''beyond reasonable doubt''. The civil standard relates to the balance of probabilities.
A breach of a drinking banning order could have serious consequences, not to mention the stigma. That is the important point because, whatever the Minister says, there is a whiff of criminality about the provision in the sense that the order would be made in a magistrates court, which is a criminal court. It seems to me and many of those to whom I have spoken that the standard of proof should be the criminal standard. In amendment No. 171, I have suggested ''beyond reasonable doubt''. 
The issue is the standard of proof to be used by the court in satisfying itself, and I should welcome the Minister's observations and her help.

Hazel Blears: The amendments are unnecessary because drinking banning orders are civil orders but  the necessary standard of proof must be equivalent to the criminal standard. That is well accepted case law from cases under antisocial behaviour legislation, which is in many ways identical to the legislation that we are considering today.
It is important to retain the civil nature of the order so that third-party evidence can be given—hearsay evidence and evidence from professional witnesses—but the standard of proof must be the criminal standard. That is well accepted law and does not need to be in the Bill, so I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

Humfrey Malins: That was a very satisfactory answer. In other parallel proceedings the standard of proof must be the criminal standard, but the Bill mentions nothing about that. It was helpful to hear from the Minister that the standard will be the criminal standard, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 14, in clause 2, page 2, line 45, at end insert—
'(6) Persons subject to— 
(a) an application under this section, or 
(b) proceedings for breach of an order pursuant to section 10, 
shall be entitled to legal aid for the purposes of representation.'. 
We all know that legal aid has been severely cut back by the Government. I do not want to be provocative, but I am going to be. It is a great disappointment that so many people are not properly represented because of the cuts in legal aid. That is as it may be, but can the Minister give an assurance that impecunious people who are, for one reason or another, unable properly to follow the proceedings will be entitled to legal aid in the normal way?

Hazel Blears: The hon. Gentleman probably knows better than any other hon. Member in the Room that there is no automatic right to legal aid. The court will consider applications for legal aid for people who are subject to drinking banning orders, as they would for applications in any other area. When an application for an order is made to magistrates, they may consider whether someone should be entitled to legal aid on the basis of their means. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman wants, as I do, to ensure that we obtain maximum value for money from the legal aid fund, which has increased dramatically in recent years. I am also sure that he would not want to make a case for people to be entitled to legal aid in every instance. The matter should not be in the Bill, but the Legal Services Commission will consider case by case whether legal aid should be granted.

Humfrey Malins: That was a helpful answer, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Humfrey Malins: It has become the practice in magistrates courts to warn defendants when they are bailed to return for the trial date that if they do not appear for trial two things may happen. A warrant may be issued for arrest. Recently, courts were  encouraged to say, ''If you are not here for your trial, the case will take place in your absence, and it may be proved against you.'' The proceedings are civil proceedings in a magistrates court. If a defendant does not turn up for one reason or another, he is not bailed, is he? If he or she has absconded, will the Minister confirm my presumption that there is provision for the proceedings to be heard and for orders to be made in the defendant's absence?

Lynne Featherstone: The debate on the clause has been useful, because it has touched on some issues that needed debating, such as the Government's lack of enforcement of legislation, and the distinction between 16 and 17-year-olds and those above those ages.
The debate did not touch on the promotion of alcoholic drinks to youngsters, and I am still concerned that the penal side of youth legislation is in place while but some of the educational and informative side is not. 
On Second Reading, the hon. Member for Warrington, North (Helen Jones) said: 
''We need the thorough review of the youth service that we have been promised for so long so that we can put in place not only worthwhile activities for young people but other activities that engage them in the community and allow them to interact with and contribute to it.''—[Official Report, 20 June 2005; Vol. 435, c. 603.]
That was a useful contribution, and I hope that the Government take note of it. I should like them to think carefully about the information and publicity given to children, because I remain deeply concerned about it. The Government should think harder about the under-16s, and deeper about enforcement. There should no longer be any delays about the promised review.

Hazel Blears: I can give the hon. Member for Woking the assurance that when a drinking banning order is made on conviction, the court will be able to make a drinking banning order in the absence of the defendant, because it will proceed with the criminal charge in the defendant's absence. The Bill provides that the court must then consider whether to make a drinking banning order, so the matter could proceed in absence.
I am pleased that the courts increasingly want to proceed in the absence of defendants, because on some occasions, defendants have sought to string out proceedings for weeks and months with several absences. It is good practice for magistrates to proceed in that way. 
In terms of free-standing applications, interim orders can be applied for on an ex parte basis in the absence of the person who is the subject of the order. The position about substantive applications that are not interim is not clear, so I shall undertake to clarify that aspect of the legislation for the hon. Gentleman, and I shall return to it. 
I have previously explained to the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green that the alcohol harm reduction strategy has a range of work streams. Some are being led by the Department of Health around sensible drinking messages, education and ensuring that young people in particular know what they are  drinking, how many units they are drinking, and what effect that can have on their health. 
The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister is involved in town centre management, and in the consideration of how different premises can be better managed. This legislation is about drinking banning orders and ensuring that the police have the necessary enforcement powers to make a difference to alcohol misuse. Our strategy is always good enforcement; it is also support, education and campaigning. They are not mutually exclusive, and we must ensure that we do both. 
Although it is sometimes easier and more comfortable to do the education and health work, it is crucial to protect the decent law-abiding majority. We are also prepared to enforce where necessary and to use the powers that the police have asked us to introduce, so that they can take action on the streets to ensure that alcohol does not continue to blight people's lives. 
Question put and agreed to. 
Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3 - Orders in County Court Proceedings

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 18, in clause 3, page 3, line 15, after 'proceedings', insert
', which shall be heard by a County Court judge within seven days of the application,'.

Eric Forth: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 25, in clause 9, page 7, line 30, after 'magistrates', insert 'or county'.
No. 26, in clause 9, page 7, line 31, after '2', insert ', 3'.

Humfrey Malins: I shuddered when I read clause 3, which relates to county court proceedings, because we all know that such proceedings can last interminably—not just for days but for weeks or months. The approach in such courts seems to be different from that in Crown courts and magistrates courts.
The clause provides for somebody who is a relevant authority but not party to the county court proceedings to make an application to be joined to those proceedings in order to apply for a drinking banning order against an individual. The prospect of such an application being heard quickly is remote. Most county courts go into recess over the summer. They do not sit at all in August, and their proceedings drag on not for months but for years. Drinking banning orders, by their very nature, should be sought and imposed with relative speed. After all, if the object is to nip something in the bud, we do not want to wait until the bud has grown, turned into a flower and dropped off the branch. My amendment, therefore, aims to ensure that the county court judge hears the application quickly, rather than permitting it to be made and listed for 56 days hence, and then agreeing to an adjournment at the request of the respondent to the application for a further 56 days. Look what happens, then: months later, there is no progress at all. 
Amendment No. 25 refers to clause 9, but it has been linked to this clause because it relates to appeals. I am not sure whether it is sensible to include a county court because one wonders what would happen in relation to a possible appeal by an individual against whom a drinking banning order is made during the course of some form of county court proceedings. That could happen.

Hazel Blears: The civil procedure rules already provide detail in relation to the making and hearing of applications. It is unnecessary to set such matters out in the Bill. I understand the hon. Gentleman's concern to ensure that applications are heard speedily, but in this case they will not be freestanding applications for drinking banning orders, they will be made in relation to existing proceedings—perhaps for eviction from a tenancy—in the context of which it is thought appropriate to bring in an application for a drinking banning order. That is similar to what happens in relation to antisocial behaviour orders, when a relative of somebody against whom proceedings are under way ought to have an order made against him because his drinking is causing problems to the neighbours and other families in the area.
This is not a matter of the police deciding that they need an order and going to the county court instead of the magistrates; it is a mechanism for attaching an application to existing proceedings. There is already provision in the civil procedure rules for the time limits to be flexible, and if cases need to be heard urgently, they can be. I know of cases in which people have made urgent applications to county court judges and have had matters dealt with very quickly. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will agree that the current civil procedure rules are flexible enough to allow that to happen and that we do not need to add anything to the Bill. However, I understand his sentiment and am pleased that he wants such matters to be heard urgently, as do I. 
The other amendments refer to technical issues concerning where appeals might lie. Any appeal against an order made in the county court must be made in accordance with part 52 of the civil procedure rules. Appeals against orders made by a district judge will be made to a circuit judge and those against orders made by a circuit judge to the High Court. There is to be no departure from that route in the case of drinking banning orders; the measures have to be seen in the context of existing proceedings in the county court. On that basis, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins: I felt a little reassured by the Minister's comments on the first of my amendments but not at all by those relating to appeal. We are considering a quasi-criminal situation, and if an order is made in the magistrates court there is an appeal, I think, to the Crown court. I shall be corrected if I am wrong; I am not being corrected, so I think I am right. Those are both criminal venues. A case goes straight from a magistrate to a recorder or a Crown court judge, hearing the appeal on a Friday, with no trouble at all. 
What, however, do we have in the provision before us? In proceedings in the county court an order is to be made by a county court judge, and it is extraordinary to me that an appeal against that drinking banning order must go to the High Court. I cannot see that any legal aid would be granted in the proceedings; it might be thought preposterous—not necessarily by me—to use public funds in that way for such an appeal. However, appeals to the High Court take months. Does the Minister really intend that someone who has been made subject to a drinking banning order in existing county court proceedings should have a right of appeal only to the High Court of Justice in the Strand? It is an astonishing prospect. However, having given my view, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4 - Variation or discharge of orders

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 19, in clause 4, page 4, line 10, at end insert
'and cannot be made until the expiry of one quarter of the period of the order.'.

Eric Forth: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 183, in clause 4, page 4, line 14, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
'(a) the court is satisfied that there has been a change in circumstances such that either the order is no longer necessary, or that it is no longer appropriate, or both; or'.

Humfrey Malins: Amendment No. 19 deals with the important issue of a variation or discharge of a drinking banning order. Indeed, the clause is headed ''Variation or discharge of orders under section 2 or 3''. The purpose of my amendment—and amendment No. 183 is along similar lines, to some extent, referring as it does to the court's being
''satisfied that there has been a change in circumstances''—
is to tease out the Minister's further thoughts on the issue of variation and discharge. Under subsection (6), a drinking banning order cannot be discharged less than halfway through. I am not entirely sure that that is appropriate. There should be more flexibility about discharge, hence my amendment No. 183. 
What about variation? It seems that under the Bill anyone can apply for a variation of the order at any stage. That is an interesting situation, Mr. Forth. If you or I are made subject to a drinking banning order on a Monday—it may perhaps be a two-year order—what are we to do about it? Under the Bill, we must wait a year before any application can be made to discharge it. We understand that, but would not it be possible under the Bill for us to return to court on Tuesday to make a variation application? 
If I am wrong, the Minister will tell me, but if I am right that makes a mockery of the view that the order cannot be discharged; it could be varied. That may give a potential defendant—or more probably a respondent, in civil proceedings—the opportunity to  appear almost weekly, without ban, on a whim, to apply again and again for variations of the order. The number of possibilities is immense. Can the Minister explain?

Hazel Blears: Clause 4(6) states that an application to vary or discharge an order can be made at any time. Following an application an order could be varied at any time, but it could not be discharged before the end of half its duration unless consent was given by the relevant authorities. With consent, it could be discharged. For example, a two-month order could not normally be discharged until a month had elapsed. The purpose of the provision is to specify that there ought to be a minimum time in which the order has a chance to affect the behaviour of the person who is the subject of the order.
We had a discussion earlier about whether a two-month minimum period was an appropriate period. There was broad agreement among members of the Committee that the prospect of a young person not being able to go to their favourite pub or club for a period of eight weeks could be quite an incentive for them to change their behaviour and perhaps get not quite so drunk the next time they visited that pub or club. We can debate where the line should be drawn and what the earliest point ought to be, but I want to see sustained evidence of changed behaviour as a result of the drinking banning order. We do not need to be too prescriptive about when applications can be made. 
Amendment No. 183 would remove the minimum period that an order must be enforced before it can be discharged and would leave the decision to the court based on whether the circumstances had changed. The court should take a view on this matter, but there should be a minimum period, which is why we have specified half the total length of the period specified. If the orders are to be effective, we cannot have a position where they do not have time to bite on the person who is guilty of criminal or disorderly behaviour or has been convicted of a fairly serious assault. For the power to be worth while, it has to be effective for a minimum period. The test that the amendment proposes is already provided for because courts are not going to discharge drinking banning orders when the behaviour has not changed enough for the order to be no longer necessary. 
The provisions are appropriate. They provide for a minimum period for the order to take effect. Applications for variation can be made, and it might be that circumstances have changed in relation to where the person lives, or that some other prohibition in the order that is no longer appropriate needs to be varied, but the core provisions that ban people from going to pubs and clubs where they cause the most problems ought to have time to bite.

Humfrey Malins: Where in the clause is there any provision to prevent an applicant or respondent from making weekly, or nightly, applications to vary the terms of the order?

Hazel Blears: The hon. Gentleman, from his extensive court experience, will know that where there is an abuse of the process of the court, there is provision for action to be taken. If applications are  made in a frivolous and vexatious way, the courts will be able to deal with them. We are considering a perfectly sensible provision that the order ought to operate for a minimum period, but that people ought to be able to apply to vary it. We want to get the balance right between the rights of people subject to such orders and the need to protect the community. This procedure provides that correct balance while ensuring that there is no abuse of the process of the court, and that the order has time to take effect to change the behaviour of the person who is the subject of the order.

Humfrey Malins: I am sorry to say that the Minister's answer does not satisfy me. The truth of the matter is that an order can be made on Monday and there is absolutely nothing in the Bill that prevents a respondent to the order from going back to court on Tuesday and issuing a complaint seeking to vary—not discharge—the terms of the order.
Let us assume, for example, that the order specifies that the person concerned shall not enter 28 named licensed premises in the constituency of Woking. That order is made on a Monday. The next day, the respondent can lodge a formal application to vary the terms of the order to make it 27 rather than 28 licensed premises, and so on. The question of abuse is rarely raised when a magistrates court acts against an applicant. It is used more against the Crown than anything—for example, in cases of abuse of process. I wonder whether I can press the Minister slightly on that point.

Hazel Blears: The hon. Gentleman can press me, but he has acknowledged that there is a procedure for abuse of process, as he well knows from his extensive legal experience. Where defendants, respondents or applicants act frivolously and vexatiously, the court can make an application that that is abuse of process. The court can also make people pay costs, which can be a good incentive for people not to bring forward empty applications. I am informed that the ultimate sanction is that the Attorney-General can take proceedings to restrain a person from making further applications without leave of the court. I understand that the hon. Gentleman is seeking to make his point, which is that there are no measures available to stop frivolous applications, but we have heard him give a series of hyperbolic examples. From his experience he should know that courts are fairly practical places, and I have every confidence that they will deal robustly with applications that they deem to be frivolous, vexatious, an abuse of the court's process or a waste of its time.

Humfrey Malins: I thank the Minister for describing me as ''hyperbolic''; I must look it up. However, is it within the court's power upon an application by the respondent to vary the terms of an order to lift the order pending the hearing of the variation?

Hazel Blears: It would be my understanding that there is no power to discharge the order until half the period of the order has expired. If the hon. Gentleman seeks to draw a distinction between lifting and discharging, it would be interesting to explore that fine distinction. I understand that the court has no power to discharge the order; it remains in place while  the application for variation is being heard. On that basis, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Humfrey Malins: Which I shall do. Not with any degree of happiness, but the Minister has given her best and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5 - Orders on conviction in criminal proceedings

Lynne Featherstone: I beg to move amendment No. 120, in clause 5, page 4, line 34, leave out subsection (5).

Eric Forth: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
No. 20, in clause 6, page 5, line 6, leave out from 'court' to end of line 7 and insert 
'must issue a warrant without bail for his arrest.'. 
No. 21, in clause 6, page 5, line 9, leave out 'adequate' and insert '14 days,'.

Lynne Featherstone: The amendment seeks to ask the question why, and I want the Government's explanation. Clause 5 relates to orders on conviction in criminal proceedings. In clause 5(4), it is reasonable for a court to have to give its reasons for not issuing a drinking banning order when conditions have been satisfied. If conditions have been satisfied and the public need protection, we have a right to know why the court has decided against what seems to be logic.
However, clause 5(5) is more problematic, because if the conditions in clause 2(2) are not satisfied, the court is asked to give its reasons for not issuing the order. That means that the court has to explain why it does not think it necessary to make an order to protect persons. If the conditions have not been satisfied, why should we put that undue pressure on the court? It may put the court on the defensive. It would be a brave court that took the decision not to err on the side of caution in such circumstances when eyes were on it. We believe that the decision should be at the courts' discretion in such circumstances and that the court should not have to explain itself when the conditions have not been met.

Humfrey Malins: I think that I am to speak to amendments 20 and 21, which relate to clause 6. Clearly, I will not be speaking on them at that stage, but they are probing amendments to clause 6, where it states that
''the court may further adjourn the proceedings or may issue a warrant for his arrest.''
I am simply trying to toughen it up a bit. I do not think that the Minister will accept the amendment but it is an opportunity for me to say that courts are too reluctant to issue warrants for people's arrest when they fail to answer to their bail. [Interruption.] I understand that other matters are going on outside the Room, but I realise that everybody present is listening with the greatest interest to what I say.

Stephen Pound: You are the new leader of the Tory party.

Humfrey Malins: I am grateful.
It is merely a way of drawing the attention of the Minister, and of the House of Commons, to the fact that far too many people in criminal proceedings—it is a different parallel—are not answering bail, and that courts ought to issue warrants without bail at the drop of a hat. 
Amendment No. 21, would amend subsection (6), which states that the defendant should have had 
''adequate notice of the time and place of the adjourned proceedings.''
Magistrates courts have rules about notice of proceedings; it is often 14, 21 or 28 days. I wonder what is the Minister's view of ''adequate notice''. There is much to be said for making it 14 days. Curiously enough, that is exactly what the amendment suggests.

Hazel Blears: As the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green explained, amendment No. 120 seeks to remove the provision that would ensure that if the court decides the conditions for a drinking banning order are not satisfied, it must state its conclusion and its reasons. It is in the interests of open justice that the wider community should know whether the conditions have been met and why.
The purpose of the legislation is to try to ensure that local people can see that action is being taken on the issues that are of most concern to them. I would have expected the hon. Lady to welcome the fact that justice should not only be done but be seen to be done openly, transparently and inclusively. I have said before that I want drinking banning orders to be used proactively by the courts. The DBO should not be an order of last resort, but one of the tools that the courts can use to tackle the problems of alcohol misuse that beset so many communities. I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment, because as a general matter of principle, more transparency and openness in the criminal justice system on how decisions are reached is in everyone's interests. 
The hon. Member for Woking asked that courts should issue warrants without bail. Again, I believe that they should have discretion. Because of family circumstances or a range of other issues, bail will be appropriate in some cases and not in others. He also raised the question of what is an adequate period of notice. Again, it could be 14 days, but it could be less. It could be as little as seven days, and I believe that it should be open to the court to determine what that adequate period should be, based on the circumstances.

Lynne Featherstone: I am somewhat persuaded by the Minister. I am in favour of openness and accountability. Not knowing a huge amount about court procedure, I was concerned that there would be undue pressure if a court felt that it needed to reveal everything. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Clauses 6 and 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8 - Interim orders

Hazel Blears: I beg to move amendment No. 68, in clause 8, page 6, line 43, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
'(3) Where this section applies by virtue of subsection (1)(a), an application for an interim order against an individual— 
(a) may be made without notice being given to that individual, and 
(b) may be heard in the absence of that individual.'.

Eric Forth: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment No. 23, in clause 8, page 6, line 43, after 'may', insert 'not'. 
Amendment No. 22, in clause 8, page 6, line 44, leave out from 'made' to end of line 44 and insert 
'after the expiry of 24 hours following notice in writing being served on the individual.'. 
Amendment No. 123, in clause 8, page 6, line 44, at end insert— 
'(3A) But an interim order shall not take effect until the subject of the order has been served with a copy of the order.'. 
Government amendments Nos. 69 to 73. 
Amendment No. 24, in clause 8, page 7, line 15, leave out subsection (7). 
Amendment No. 124, in clause 8, page 7, line 22, at end insert— 
'(7A) Before renewing an interim order under this section, the court must be satisfied that it is just so to do. In considering whether it is just so to do, the court must consider— 
(a) the seriousness of the conduct alleged; 
(b) any evidential or other difficulties experienced by the applicant; and 
(c) whether the effect of the renewal will be to rob the final proceedings of their significance.'.

Hazel Blears: I hope that the amendments will not detain the Committee long. The Government amendments clarify the procedure for applications for interim orders made without notice, and make it clear that applications can be heard in the absence of the individual concerned. The hon. Member for Woking referred to the matter in an earlier debate.
The Government amendments also correct a minor drafting error, and they remove the reference to an application for an ex parte interim order on conviction. The latter is unnecessary, because unlike the procedure for antisocial behaviour orders, the court must consider making a drinking banning order on conviction, and no application is made or required. 
Criminal courts can convict and sentence in the absence of the defendant—or, in the case of a civil order, the respondent—and will be able to make an interim drinking banning order on conviction, regardless of whether the defendant is present in court. Applications for ex parte interim orders are necessary only in the context of free-standing applications, not for applications on conviction. 
Permission for an application for an interim order without notice may be given only when the court or clerk is satisfied that it is necessary for the application to be made without the individual concerned receiving notice, and an amendment will be made to allow for that. I hope that those minor and technical Government amendments clarify the position on ex parte interim orders.

Humfrey Malins: I shall speak first to amendments Nos. 23 and 22, in my name, and shall go on to discuss amendment No. 124. I believe that the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green intends to speak to some of the amendments in the group, including amendments Nos. 123 and 124.
Clause 8 is important because it deals with interim orders, which are related to free-standing applications to the magistrates court for drinking banning orders. The measures and clauses in the Bill require some consultation between relevant authorities such as the police, the local authority and various officers, rather than members, of the local authority. As I said in an earlier debate, the problem with that scenario is the potential for delay, to which the Minister gave her answer as best she could. 
I assume that in clause 8 an interim order means what it would mean in normal legal terms—an order that could be made in a great hurry, when speed was of the essence. That is an odd concept to put against the concept of taking one's time—[Interruption.] Forgive me, Mr. Forth. I am distracted by constant noises outside in the Corridor, as I imagine we all are. The concept that I have just described seems odd when one considers that there will inevitably be delays with county court applications and appeals to the High Court. 
Clause 8(3), for which I see no justification, troubles me. It states: 
''An application for an interim order against an individual may be made without notice being given to that individual.''
I ask myself why on earth an individual should not have notice of the application. I appreciate that in some court proceedings, such as domestic violence proceedings, there is a need for immediate action. Take a case in which a husband or wife is assaulting their spouse on a daily basis—[Interruption.] Really, Mr. Forth, I am finding it hard to continue, because of the constant comings and goings of other people in and out of the Room, and the immense noise outside. 
That has occupied 30 seconds; now I will carry on. There are emergency cases, when people need to apply to court for a ruling overnight without notice. A spouse might need to apply within one hour—to go to the court straight away and seek an injunction. In such cases, there is no time to give notice to the respondent, as it might be vital that the court grant the application in a matter of hours. That is the point—that immediate protection is needed. That is an interim order in matrimonial proceedings, but why is there an interim order in the Bill? What is so urgent? If the police believe the defendant to be guilty of a criminal offence, he or she will have been arrested and might be in custody. If so, why should not that person receive notice of an interim application? It is easy to arrange,  and it is natural justice to give notice of proceedings to someone who might be affected by them. 
 If, on the other hand, the police have charged the defendant in the criminal proceedings and released him on bail to an address in, say, Somerset, the position is plainly not so acute that an interim application must be made. If it were, no doubt the person would have been in custody. I am therefore at a loss to know why there are no provisions saying that the Government may, by all means, make an application for an interim order, but stating that they must give notice to the individual concerned. 
Amendment No. 22 follows amendment No. 23 by saying that an application can be made if 24 hours' notice is given and served on the individual concerned, because at least that individual would then have some form of notification that an application was about to be made. 
Amendment No. 24 would remove subsection (7). I am concerned about the renewal of interim orders. When an interim order is made in relation to, for example, a case of matrimonial violence, the courts are extremely careful not to renew orders indefinitely without holding a substantive hearing. After all, an interim order is meant to be a very short-term sticking plaster before the main application is properly heard. That would make sense to anyone. I am therefore concerned, as are many others who have expressed their views to me, that an interim order can be renewed once, or more than once. How often could that be? Could it be renewed on one, two, three, four or five occasions? Will the Minister explain at some length her thinking about the need for a statute that permits renewed applications to be made—and, what is more, without any notice being given to the respondent to the application?

Lynne Featherstone: Amendment No. 123 is very similar to the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Woking. It is totally reasonable in certain circumstances to make an order without notice, but it is not reasonable to make that order without the person concerned being made aware of it. If the Government will not accept the amendment, it would be good if they would say that every possible means would be used to serve such a notice, because to advance an order without notice being served seems to be against the principles of natural justice.
Amendment No. 124 is very similar to amendment No. 24, tabled by the hon. Member for Woking. It too seeks to insert at the end of line 22 provisions relating to the seriousness of the conduct and the nature of the renewals to prevent abuse of an interim order. Without a higher threshold, there could be any number of renewals and any number of reasons for those renewals. One must be careful, because an interim order might be renewed so many times that it would rob the final significance of any court proceedings. I would welcome clarification from the Minister on what limit there might be on the number of times that an interim order could be renewed. I do not believe that difficulties of evidence can be used ad infinitum as a reason for continual renewal, which might simply be  a reflection of poor performance. The individual should not suffer as a result of the poor performance of the authorities.

Hazel Blears: The amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Woking would require 24 hours' notice before an application for an interim drinking banning order could be made. I understand his argument, but there may well be rare occasions on which someone's behaviour is so out of control that immediate action must be taken. After all, we are talking about people whose behaviour is criminal or disorderly as a result of alcohol and who are causing problems to the rest of the community, so immediate action will need to be taken, albeit on rare occasions.
One of the prohibitions under a drinking banning order could, for example, be not associating with certain other persons, their regular drinking companions, to prevent them from going out and causing the sort of mayhem in which they have been involved. Again, there might well be occasions when an immediate interim order is necessary; I invite hon. Members to consider some of the applications that have been made for antisocial behaviour orders.

Humfrey Malins: We are all aware that it might sometimes be essential to issue an order quickly or, indeed, immediately, but how does it follow that the person subject to the application should not be served notice? The two are completely different points. I apologise for intervening at such length, but if the conduct is of such gravity that an emergency application is clearly required, the person must have committed a criminal offence, unless the Minister tells me otherwise, and will have been remanded in custody or bailed. In any event, it is still possible and desirable to give notice.

Hazel Blears: I agree that it is desirable that people be given notice in most circumstances.

Humfrey Malins: In all circumstances.

Hazel Blears: No. Our law recognises that it is right to make ex parte orders in certain circumstances. People who have been subjected to appalling behaviour by an individual might well be intimidated and harassed or otherwise contacted by that individual, and it might be necessary to make an ex parte order to protect those people from intimidation and harassment by the person who is the subject of the order. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is aware of many other situations like that. We must retain the ability to make an ex parte interim order on the admittedly rare occasions when it is necessary to do so. Denying the courts the ability to make such orders would tie their hands unnecessarily when we want them to use the powers in the most effective way.
The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green would require an interim order not to take effect until someone had been served with a copy of that order. I understand her point. Court orders are generally put into effect when they are made, but clearly someone needs to be notified that the prohibitions are in place if they are to abide by them. It is not appropriate to include that in the Bill,  but I am happy to consider that position to see whether we can set out the need to serve someone personally, and to consider any guidance that we can issue to ensure that we cover the point that the hon. Lady made. 
 Amendment No. 24 would prevent the court from renewing interim orders. The provision provides that interim orders can be renewed for a period of four weeks, and there is no limit on renewal because it is a matter for the courts to determine. They will have the evidence in front of them and will see whether it is necessary to renew the order. Our experience with the antisocial behaviour legislation is that the courts are pretty keen to scrutinise the evidence before them. They do not make these orders lightly or in a way that does not reflect the evidence, and it is important that they should have that flexibility without us legislating specifically that the order can be renewed only once, twice or three times. Again, the courts will be very conscious that they are making orders that carry prohibitions and that affect the way in which people lead their lives, and they will not want to extend the orders unnecessarily without proceeding to a full hearing. 
Amendment No. 124 talks about the orders being renewed only 
''if it is just to do so''.
That is exactly what the courts are there to do. They consider the evidence, the degree of seriousness and appropriateness, and proportionality. That is exactly the sort of balancing test that they carry out every day. They will issue an order if the evidence fulfils the criteria, but they will not issue one if it does not. The addition of the words 
''if it is just to do so''
would pre-empt the proper role of the courts in this process. I have no doubt that they will scrutinise these matters extremely carefully. The amendments are therefore unnecessary, and I ask the hon. Members to withdraw them.

Humfrey Malins: Strictly speaking, as I have not pressed my amendment to a vote, there is no question of my withdrawing it. I shall simply say a few more words and we shall not vote on the matter. Has the Minister consulted widely with the judiciary on this issue? That is a serious question. I once asked another Minister whether he or she had consulted with the district judges, magistrates courts and Crown court judges before introducing legislation, and the answer was no, but that that would be done in future. Has the right hon. Lady consulted with the district judge bench, the lay bench and the Crown court bench on this clause? I ask because a senior judge wrote to me some time ago to express deep concern about the fact that an application could proceed without notice, and saying that some effort should surely be made to give notice to the person affected. If a person cannot be traced to give notice, how will the order be served after it has been made? Those are fair questions and the Minister has not answered them.

Hazel Blears: I can reassure the hon. Gentleman that the draft Bill was sent to the Lord Chief Justice on behalf of the judiciary, that we are consulting the  judiciary on guidance and that we keep in regular contact. Clearly, we would take note of any substantive points that the judiciary as a whole might want to make to us about the practical application of the provisions of the Bill. It is drafted in accordance with the way in which courts normally view such matters—for ex parte applications, for renewals and for interim orders. The courts will consider the evidence and they should have the discretion and the flexibility to make appropriate orders in all circumstances.

Lynne Featherstone: I am reassured by the Minister's faith in the judiciary, albeit a faith not shared by the Prime Minister.
Amendment agreed to. 
Amendments made: No. 69, in clause 8, page 7, line 1, after 'making', insert 'or hearing'. 
No. 70, in clause 8, page 7, line 3, leave out 
'or before the Crown Court or'. 
No. 71, in clause 8, page 7, line 5, leave out 
'or of proceedings in such a court'. 
No. 72, in clause 8, page 7, line 8, after 'satisfied', insert '(a)'. 
No. 73, in clause 8, page 7, line 9, at end insert— 
'(b) that it is not necessary for the application to be heard in the presence of the individual.'.—[Hazel Blears.] 
Clause 8, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9 - Appeals

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Humfrey Malins: Can the Minister confirm that if a magistrates court makes a drinking banning order, the appeal to the Crown court is to be made in the normal time allowed for the making of appeals from the magistrates court to the Crown court in criminal matters? If so, can she tell us what that period is?

Hazel Blears: I can assure the hon. Gentleman that the appeal is made in the normal way from the magistrates courts to the Crown court in criminal matters. He has the advantage of me as to the time period, and I am sure that he would like to enlighten the Committee in that regard, as a result of his extensive practical experience.
Question put and agreed to. 
Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10 - Breach of drinking banning orders

Hazel Blears: I beg to move amendment No. 74, in clause 10, page 8, line 2, leave out
'to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or'.

Eric Forth: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment No. 27, in clause 10, page 8, line 2, leave out '51 weeks' and insert '6 months'. 
Government amendments Nos. 75 and 76. 
Amendment No. 28, in clause 10, page 8, line 7, leave out subsection (4). 
Amendment No. 128, in clause 10, page 8, line 42, leave out subsection (12) and insert— 
'(12) The Secretary of State must not make an order unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.'.

Hazel Blears: Amendments Nos. 74, 75 and 76 seek to remove the possibility of a custodial penalty being imposed for breach of a drinking banning order because we want to ensure that the courts use drinking banning orders where it is appropriate for them to do so. In addition to the ability of the magistrates courts to make a drinking banning order on application, the Bill also requires the courts to consider making such an order following conviction in every case in which the individual was under the influence of alcohol when the offence was committed. A high number of offences are committed while those responsible are under the influence of alcohol, and on reflection we consider that a custodial penalty purely for breach of a drinking banning order is not justified at this time, given the availability of fines and community sentences as effective deterrents.
Additionally, breach of a drinking banning order will be an aggravating factor when a court considers a sentence for any other offence committed alongside the breach. That could result in a custodial sentence. We believe that custody should be reserved for the most serious, dangerous and persistent offenders. There will still be potential for offenders to receive custodial sentences for persistent breaches of the community sentence imposed for breach of a drinking banning order.

Humfrey Malins: If the Minister is right that custody should be reserved for the most serious and dangerous offenders, why does breach of an ASBO carry five years?

Hazel Blears: Breach of an ASBO can carry a custodial penalty of up to five years, because it is clearly a serious matter, but custody is not mandatory for breach of an ASBO, and in many cases, particularly where young people are concerned, community penalties have been used, with a range of other sentences. Earlier in our debate the hon. Gentleman welcomed the flexibility that the Government introduced in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, enabling a range of different community penalties to be used by judges and magistrates to target offences. Now he is trying to face both ways. He says that he welcomes a range of community penalties because he thinks that they are much more useful for targeting behaviour and getting people to change their behaviour than the old sentences of custody or a fine; yet now he says that a range of penalties for breach of a drinking banning order is not appropriate.
 Breach of an ASBO will often happen after a lengthy period in which people are subjected to  violence, intimidation and harassment, which is intolerable behaviour to many of our constituents. Breach of a drinking banning order may amount to someone going into a pub from which they are excluded and carrying on visiting it as they used to. That is of a significantly different character from some breaches of the serious prohibitions in ASBOs. We are aiming for proportionate penalties for breach of a drinking banning order. If the hon. Gentleman means to say that courts should always respond to such incidents in the same way, he means to deny them that flexibility. 
Custody should be reserved for serious, dangerous and persistent offenders, but it will still be available for persistent breaches of the community sentence imposed for the original breach of the drinking banning order. We do not propose to change the requirement that courts should consider making a drinking banning order following a conviction in every case. That is another point of difference from ASBOs, which are made on application or where a serious chain of events has occurred, in a persistent chronic set of circumstances. Drinking banning orders might not always be made in those circumstances. They might be made to give people a short, sharp shock. They might last for two months only. We do not think that breach of a two-month drinking banning order should necessarily result in a custodial sentence.

Jeremy Wright: Does the Minister accept that for persistent breaches of a longer drinking banning order it might be sensible to allow the courts the option—it is no more than that under the clause—to impose a custodial sentence? Does not she accept that, if the order is to be taken seriously, repeated breach of it over a prolonged period should carry the possibility of custody?

Hazel Blears: I have set out why the penalties should be community penalties and fines. If the community penalties are breached there is the prospect of custody. We must ensure that punishments in our criminal justice system are proportionate to the mischief with which we want to deal. What we are considering is significantly different from the serious and persistent antisocial behaviour that would be subject to an antisocial behaviour order. Therefore it is appropriate to tell people that, if they appear in court for breaching a drinking banning order, a community penalty—possibly a quite severe one—will be imposed, and that breaching that order carries the prospect of custody, giving people the sense that the punishment will be ratcheted up for any breaches that take place. That should be sufficient and appropriate to change the behaviour, which we want the legislation to promote. It is not simply about punishing people, but about getting them to change their behaviour in the first place.

Jeremy Wright: Assuming that the offender responds to community punishment properly but still continues to breach the drinking banning order, how will he be dissuaded from continuing the drinking behaviour that the order seeks to address? 
Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
On resuming—

Jim Sheridan: On a point of order, Mr. Forth. Given the interference and the irresponsible and unruly behaviour that came from outside the Room earlier on, is it within your influence to move such people on if that situation occurs in the future? Although it may not have been a crime, it nonetheless interfered with the proceedings of this House.

Eric Forth: I was also conscious of the disturbance, and I considered suspending the Committee. However, I felt that it was probably in the interests of business to proceed, and we managed to do so. I shall raise the point with the appropriate authorities, however, because the disturbance was unseemly to say the least, and most inconsiderate to those of us who are trying to do our job. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments. They are certainly duly noted.
The Committee is in the process of considering Government amendment No. 74 together with the others in that group. Has the Minister concluded?

Hazel Blears: I was about to respond to the hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth (Jeremy Wright), but as he is no longer in his seat, all I want to place on the record is that the situation he set out, in which somebody complies fully with their community penalty and still continues to breach their drinking banning order, is unlikely to occur. We would have the opportunity to return to community penalties and fines, so the situation he set out is unrealistic.

Humfrey Malins: My hon. Friend the Member for Rugby and Kenilworth made a telling intervention, and I am proud to congratulate him on it. He asked why in a very bad case of breach we could not give the courts the discretion to issue as their final, if rarely used, punishment a term of imprisonment. It is extraordinary, bare-faced cheek that the Government do not explain their reasoning.
The Government published a Bill earlier this year with a flagship policy. What was it? It is the drinking banning order. They then set out in the Bill that anyone who breaches an order will be liable to 51 weeks' imprisonment. That is what they thought in January, February, March, April, May, June and July, and they must have had some reason to think it. What on earth was the reason behind the complete and utter U-turn on policy? There must be some reasoning for it. 
Presumably, there may be in this Room persons who had something to do with the drafting of the Bill, or with the advice given to the Minister. The advice was plain: it is important to have a custodial sentence as one option open to the court. None of us would disagree with that proposition. 
On Second Reading the Minister could well have stood up and argued before the House of Commons that the possibility of a custodial sentence was essential  as one of the punishments. The Minister would have happily deployed that argument a few months ago. I should like her to deploy it again, and then to tell us how and why she has changed her mind. My hon. Friend in his excellent intervention suggested that we should by all means keep custody as one possibility to be used not straight away but in a case in which there are continued, flagrant breaches of an order. 
If I may say so gently, the Minister put up a very poor argument—I am not sure whether she drafted it herself—about the difference between sentencing powers in relation to the breach of an ASBO and those in relation to the breach of a drink banning order.

Stephen McCabe: I am curious to know how the hon. Gentleman reconciles his current comments with those he made earlier. He told us then that the order was outrageous, that it could taint an individual's character and that it drew an unacceptable parallel with criminality. Now he is saying that the very order he feels so strongly about could be used as a vehicle for putting someone in prison. How does he reconcile those positions?

Humfrey Malins: I suggest that the hon. Gentleman reads Hansard. I said no such thing.

Stephen McCabe: I think that the hon. Gentleman did.

Humfrey Malins: I venture to suggest that the hon. Gentleman needs to listen carefully to what I say; we shall talk about it again. I never said that the order was outrageous. I said that because of the serious nature of such an order, which is made in a criminal court, it is appropriate that a person might be entitled to legal aid, given the possible stain on their character. That has nothing to do with the point in question at the moment.
How can the Minister say that prison must be retained for the most serious and dangerous offenders? I think that that is what she said. Is she living in the real world? Let us consider serious and dangerous offenders. I mentioned a while ago that I had been involved in a case where someone had breached an ASBO. They had been banned from entering a London borough—I forget which; it may have been Greenwich—and they had entered it. That is all. They had not done anything rotten while they were there; they just entered it. It may well be that the Minister is going to try to persuade us that that is a most serious and dangerous thing to do, but when it came before the court and a custodial sentence was imposed there was no successful appeal. It was thought to be a perfectly proper approach. This was not a serious or dangerous person, but someone who had breached an ASBO. Such a breach carries a sentence of five years on indictment. 
No distinction is made between the two cases, and to do a complete volte face on the issue of custody is quite extraordinary. At the end of the day, the breach of a drink banning order can be very serious because it is a direct flouting of a court's order. It is akin to contempt of court. Let it happen once and perhaps the court can impose a fine or a community penalty. Let it happen twice and perhaps the court can ratchet up to another community penalty. But if it happens three,  four or five times, why should the court not have the ability to impose a custodial sentence in an extreme case? 
The Minister has disappointed us on that aspect. She has a duty to tell us this afternoon in the clearest language why she could and would have advanced an argument in May or June, which she would have then described as compelling, that the breach of a drink banning order should carry a custodial sentence, when only a matter of weeks later she tells us that there are compelling arguments why there should be no custodial sentence. What has changed in the world? If the Minister wants to tell us what has changed since June, she can do so. The Government's own Bill said that we should have a custodial sentence. Now they have changed their mind, and we need to know the reasons why. 
I turn to amendments Nos. 28 and 128. Amendment No. 128 is important because I refer to subsection (12) which deals with the ability of the Secretary of State to make an order exercisable by statutory instrument. This takes us to the procedures of the House of Commons and it seems that we are talking about subsection (6), which says: 
''The Secretary of State may by order provide that a person of a description specified in the order can bring proceedings for an offence under subsection (1)''.
That is quite a serious and weighty burden on someone. The House of Commons should have a good opportunity to consider what order may be made under the subsection and to debate it. 
Amendment No. 28 relates to conditional discharge. I want to know whether I am right in saying that if a person is guilty of an offence—that is to say, is in breach of a drinking banning order—the court is prohibited from imposing a conditional discharge as a punishment. If the court is prohibited from doing so, I want to know why. The punishment is regularly used by the courts. The defendant is granted a conditional discharge for, say, six months. That means that if they do not offend in those six months, they will hear no more about it, but if they do offend, they will be charged and sentenced not only for that offence but for the breach of the conditional discharge. Why is a conditional discharge apparently removed from the options available to the court under this clause?

Lynne Featherstone: I welcome Government amendment No. 74. I would be interested to understand the Minister's change of heart, because that would indicate her thinking. However, at least there is now a logic to the argument that she has been making about this being a less-than-criminal offence. When we know what is involved, disorder may not be the severest of offences, and I understood that breaching a drinking banning order was to be a lesser offence. It is therefore right that there should not be a custodial sentence. I welcome a community sentence.
Amendment No. 128 is intended to deal with a situation in which too much power is placed in the  hands of the Secretary of State. Many aspects of the Bill seem to have needed rethinking, adjusting or redrafting, and there have been so many amendments that it is of the utmost importance that the Government should not simply use statutory instruments to make changes. The clause would allow the Secretary of State to keep adding to the list without any further substantive monitoring of changes made. It would be beneficial for no such order to be made unless a draft had been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.

Hazel Blears: The hon. Member for Woking is making heavy weather of this issue. As I said before, drinking banning orders can range from two months to two years. In some cases, it will be necessary to give people a short, sharp shock about their behaviour, and custody is not appropriate in those cases. Something like 342,000 offences are committed under the influence of alcohol. We are keeping the provision that states that where there is a conviction for an offence committed under the influence of alcohol, the courts must consider making a drinking banning order, and there are therefore likely to be far more drinking banning orders than antisocial behaviour orders. That is quite right when these problems are plaguing a community.
As I have said on several occasions, I want the courts to use orders proactively and say, ''We have a person in front of us. They committed an assault when drunk. In addition to the penalty for that assault, we want to make a drinking banning order to stop them going in the pubs where they have been going for the last few weeks and drinking far too much, which resulted in the kind of violence that we saw.'' We therefore want to ensure that the penalties are proportionate and that we are not in territory where the courts will resile from using the orders because they feel that they are too draconian. We want the orders to be as flexible as possible, in terms not just of the prohibitions that they include and the length of time that they last, but of the penalties for breaching them. I ask hon. Members to think seriously about this matter. In pushing for custody, the hon. Gentleman is not looking at the—

Humfrey Malins: The Minister misunderstands the point.

Hazel Blears: I understand the point, but the hon. Gentleman is making incredibly heavy weather of it. He wants custody to be an option. The option of community penalties and fines, and a range of community sentences that he has welcomed, are perfectly sufficient. Community orders can be a big imposition on people's lifestyle, as they have to make some restoration for the damage that they have caused. If the community penalty is breached and the person is brought back to court, he can face custody; and if there is another conviction, the fact that he has breached the drinking banning order would be an aggravating factor when sentencing. There are a number of ways in which sentences can be taken seriously.

Humfrey Malins: The Minister does herself a disservice. She should not say that I am pressing for custody. When she reflects upon that comment, she will realise that it is wholly inappropriate. At no stage have I pressed for custody. It is important to think before one speaks. I did not press for custody; I pressed for the option to be open to the court. That is all. Will the Minister please tell us why something that was thought proper in June this year—custody—is thought improper in October?

Hazel Blears: I think that I have given a proper explanation. Something like 342,000 offences could be subject to drinking banning orders. I accept that the hon. Gentleman was not pressing for custody in every case, but he wanted the option to be open to the courts. I have explained why other community penalties should be sufficient to bring people up sharply by confronting them with the consequences of their behaviour.
The hon. Gentleman spoke to amendment No. 28; that, too, shows that he is trying to face in two directions. That amendment would provide the option of a conditional discharge as a penalty for breaching a drinking banning order. A conditional discharge does not send out the message that sanctions will follow the breach of such orders. We have adopted a good middle way—if I dare use such a phrase. 
When a drinking banning order is breached, the penalty is a community sentence or a fine. A conditional discharge is far too light a penalty; people will not be seen as facing any sort of sanction for breaching an order. Equally, custody is not appropriate if people have merely breached a community penalty. We have tried to adopt a reasonable, proportionate and moderate way of dealing with such matters, and ensuring that the penalties are appropriate. 
Amendment No. 28 would mean that those who broke a drinking banning order—those who had conducted themselves in a criminal or disorderly way as a result of their alcohol-fuelled behaviour, which had caused problems for others—would face the prospect of a conditional discharge. That does not sent out the right message. It says that a drinking banning order is a matter of little consequence. I seek to persuade the hon. Gentleman not to press his amendment; if he does, I ask the Committee to vote against it. It will not reinforce the authority of the court. 
The amendments of the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green say that regulations should be made under the affirmative rather than the negative procedure. It would not be a good use of parliamentary time to ask that all orders of that nature should be debated. Orders made under clause 10(6) could extend the range of persons who can apply for a drinking banning order. It is entirely appropriate for that sort of order to be subject to the negative resolution procedure. If hon. Members felt strongly about the matter, they could pray against the order and then debate it. That is the appropriate way to proceed. 
Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 12, Noes 4.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
Amendments made: No. 75, in clause 10, page 8, line 3, leave out ', or to both'. 
No. 76, in clause 10, page 8, line 4, leave out subsection (3).—[Hazel Blears.] 
Clause 10, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11 - Interpretation of Chapter 1

Lynne Featherstone: I beg to move amendment No. 130, in clause 11, page 9, line 47, leave out from beginning to end of line 12 on page 10.

Eric Forth: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 33, in clause 11, page 9, line 47, leave out subsection (3).

Lynne Featherstone: We are back to the Secretary of State and his wide-ranging powers—in this case, to regard a person as a relevant authority—and I am worried that the provision could be interpreted too widely. There should be a safeguard; otherwise anyone, even a malicious individual, could be considered to be a relevant authority.
Omitting the words in my amendment would not limit in any way the number of times the Secretary of State could make a statutory instrument and adjust the exceptions, exemptions, provisions and so on. I appreciate that parliamentary time is precious, but it would not escape the notice of the House if the Secretary of State dodged in and out daily, and it might be construed that the additions to the provisions were excessive.

Hazel Blears: Our current view is that it is appropriate for only the police and local authorities to be relevant authorities as defined in the Bill in terms of applying for drinking banning orders. However, in future we may wish to extend the provision to others, and it is therefore helpful for the Secretary of State to have the power in clause 11(3) to do that by order rather than having to await a further legislative slot to amend the Bill.
Such matters are commonly dealt with by secondary legislation and there is a range of precedents. It is sometimes difficult to get primary legislative slots—although it sometimes seems that the Home Office is legislating for the whole Government. I ask the hon. Lady to consider the matter on the  practical basis that we may need to amend the Bill, so the order-making power is appropriate.

Lynne Featherstone: On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12 - Power to impose charges on

Lynne Featherstone: I beg to move amendment No. 132, in clause 12, page 10, line 17, after first 'authority', insert ', or local authorities,'.

Eric Forth: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment No. 131, in clause 12, page 10, line 17, after 'month', insert
', at an annual rate of no greater than three per cent of a premises' rateable value,'. 
Amendment No. 35, in clause 12, page 10, line 21, leave out paragraph (b). 
Amendment No. 43, in clause 12, page 10, line 23, at end insert 
'provided that no charges shall be paid, or be payable, by any persons or clubs unless the local authority reasonably believes that such persons or clubs by their acts, or omissions, contribute to the incidence of alcohol-related crime or disorder in the locality.'. 
Amendment No. 36, in clause 12, page 10, line 23, at end insert 
'and 
(c) designated premises supervisors or tenants not holding such a licence but who are responsible for the day-to-day running of the premises.'. 
Amendment No. 39, in clause 12, page 10, line 34, leave out 'appropriate' and insert 'essential'. 
Amendment No. 40, in clause 12, page 10, line 35, leave out 'appropriate' and insert 'essential'. 
Amendment No. 41, in clause 12, page 11, line 23, leave out paragraph (a). 
Amendment No. 62, in clause 12, page 11, line 29, leave out paragraph (c). 
Amendment No. 63, in clause 12, page 11, line 29, at end insert— 
'(9A) Regulations made under subsection (9) shall include provision for appeals against decisions determining such questions as set out in paragraphs (9)(a) and (b). 
Amendment No. 42, in clause 12, page 11, line 30, leave out subsection (10). 
Government amendment No. 79 
Amendment No. 145, in clause 17, page 15, line 4, leave out from 'instrument' to end of line 5 and insert 
'but the Secretary of State may not make a statutory instrument under this Chapter unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.'.

Lynne Featherstone: The clause refers to alcohol disorder zones and the amendment specifically deals with areas that cross local authority boundaries. There is an example in my constituency, where I live. Highgate high street is divided between Haringey  and Camden, with Islington a stone's throw from the bottom of Highgate village. There are five pubs within a distance of about 100 m. Therefore, although Highgate is not the sort of area that one might consider would become the subject of an alcohol disorder zone—

Lynda Waltho: I do not know about that.

Lynne Featherstone: Excuse me, I shall protect Highgate. Nevertheless, a serious amount of drinking goes on in Highgate village, so it could be classified. I seek clarification about what happens when several authorities are involved. Do they all have to apply for an alcohol disorder zone? Which one collects the charges? Which one consults on the action plan? In the case of Highgate, would all three consult? What happens if authorities disagree with each other about the likely success of an action plan and one wants to go straight to jail without passing Go, so to speak? There are examples of one borough going ahead with a controlled parking zone, causing havoc in the neighbouring borough.
I am concerned that we must not turn such areas into legislative disorder zones rather than alcohol disorder zones, and I would welcome the Minister's clarification. Perhaps the clause contains a drafting error—but it raises a million questions that need to be thought through and answered. 
Clause 12, which deals with charging, is probably one of the more long-winded and difficult parts of the Bill. Amendment No. 131 would insert after 
''paid to the local authority for each month''
the words 
''at an annual rate of no greater than three per cent of a premises' rateable value''.
Rather than make a particular recommendation, I seek to understand the Government's thinking about the charging regime. We do not have draft regulations, although I have seen some sort of guidance. Perhaps I have that the wrong way around; I am not sure whether the document is guidance or regulations. 
It is hard to judge at this point whether there will be a cap, or how the provision will be accepted. I believe that the drinks industry fears that there will be no cap or limitation on the charge. Therefore, some details of how the charging mechanism will function should be included in the Bill. 
Amendment No. 145 is, again, about the Secretary of State. I have already said several things about limiting his power. The amendment would ensure that regulations were approved by positive rather than negative resolution.

Humfrey Malins: We are beginning deliberation on an important clause. It creates alcohol disorder zones, which simply means that the Secretary of State can make provision enabling a local authority to make monthly charges against licence holders in their area. It is a fundamentally important clause, and the first thing that I want to say is that, although we on these Benches understand the need for such charges in theory, we want to insist that some provision is  included to protect premises that are innocent of wrongdoing. It seems essential to all of us on this side, and, I venture to suggest, on the Government side, that innocent premises in a particular locality should not be charged. That is a fundamental point, which will require us, I am afraid, subject to what the Government say, to divide the Committee on some of these very important amendments.
Amendment No. 131 is essentially a probing amendment, based on the fact that, under this and subsequent clauses, there appears to be no limit on the charges that can be imposed by local authorities on a particular licensed premises each month. That seems to be an extraordinary proposition, which may end up, if enforced, as nothing more nor less than a revenue-raising activity by a local authority, aimed, like a scattergun, at every single licensed premises in its area, irrespective of merit. The amendment is intended to seek out from the Minister full details of what the maximum charges may be, what the scale of charge will be likely to be, how it would be based, and so on. None of that is in the Bill, which we greatly regret. 
Amendment No 35 would omit subsection (1)(b). I am again teasing out from the Minister whether she wants to ensure that all premises that supply alcohol, even if only to their own members, such as sports clubs, are to be included within the alcohol disorder zone charges. The Bill gives the widest possible inclusion rate for premises, but no exclusion for clubs that hold a certificate. It seems an absurd proposition that if there is particular trouble in a high street of a town, on a particular night of the week, the local authorities should be able to get at every single licence holder in the area, including sports and rugby clubs, and say, ''We are declaring an alcohol disorder zone and there will be the following level of charges'', about which the Committee has not yet been informed. That is an absurd proposition. 
We believe the most important amendment in the group to be amendment No. 43, and I ask your indulgence, Mr. Forth in saying that although it is not the lead amendment, it is one about which we feel very strongly indeed. We hope for your indulgence at an appropriate stage to enable amendment No. 43 to be put to the vote so that the Committee's opinion can be tested. 
Amendment. No. 43 is of great importance. The first part of the clause has already set out the ability to make provision for the imposition of charges of people who hold licences and clubs. I seek to amend it with what I believe to be entirely reasonable words, that 
''provided that no charges shall be paid, or be payable, by any persons or clubs unless the local authority reasonably believes that such persons or clubs by their acts, or omissions, contribute to the incidence of alcohol-related crime or disorder in the locality''.
That in effect imposes a duty on local authorities to take the view and to justify it to their electorate and others in their area that they reasonably believe that the person or the premises to be charged has by his or her acts, omissions or otherwise contributed to the incidence of alcohol-related crime. What is wrong with such a provision? 
In the last few months, I have been approached by many bodies representing the trade—the many  thousands of convenience stores, the corner shops scattered round the country, and the supermarkets where people come and go innocently to buy their alcohol. I shall summarise some of their thoughts. We all know the root of the problem of late-night drinking and violence on the streets thereafter: apart from the responsibility that clearly lies on the shoulders of the individuals who behave badly, it is predominantly to be laid at the feet of those licensed premises that by their conduct help to contribute to the problem. 
For example, I know a pub in the north-east of England where people can play a slot machine. They put in a pound, pull the lever and instead of three cherries coming down as they used to years ago, down comes a sign saying, ''Next drink free'' or ''Next drink half price'' or ''Sorry you've missed out this time''. That is a direct incentive to drink more.

Stephen Pound: What is the address?

Humfrey Malins: The hon. Gentleman may ask.
I know pubs in the south of England where at certain hours of the day young ladies are admitted free and given free drinks on arrival. I know pubs where the happy hour is extended considerably; we all know of such pubs, and that is where the trouble starts. We all have family, friends or people we know who at the age of 15 or 16 get fake IDs and go into those pubs, which are a direct encouragement of irresponsible drinking. They also serve people who are drunk. 
By and large, the licensed trade is very responsible, and I applaud many in licensed premises for the good work that they do, but I am trying to isolate where the trouble is. In truth, the trouble is not in Sainsbury's, Waitrose and Tesco, or in garages that sell alcohol. The theme of the amendment is a good one: if charges are to be imposed, they cannot be imposed across the board by the local authority; there must be some statutory criteria. The fair way to do that is to write into the Bill that charges can be imposed only where the local authority reasonably believes that the premises in question, by its own acts or omissions, has contributed to the incidence of alcohol-related crime or disorder. We would understand that, but we find it difficult to understand the logic in the Bill as drafted or to see the fairness of it. 
Amendment No. 36 would insert: 
''(c) designated premises supervisors or tenants not holding such a licence but who are responsible for the day-to-day running the premises.''
As drafted, as I understand it, the offender is the person who holds the licence. In many cases, the guilty parties are absent from the premises. Let us say that I hold a licence for a premises—I do not, as it happens—but have absolutely nothing to do with running it. I might have a tenant or a supervisor who has been delegated the responsibility. That is the point of the amendment. 
I want briefly to speak about other amendments. Amendment Nos. 39 and 40 are two such. They would omit the word ''appropriate'' and insert ''essential'' in clause 12. There is trouble with subsection (4). It reads: 
''The rates of charges fixed under this section must be such as the Secretary of State considers appropriate for securing that the funds that he considers appropriate''—
with no external government on the Secretary of State— 
''are available . . . to be used for any purposes specified in or determined under subsection (2).''
To put some constraint on the Secretary of State it would be much better to leave out ''appropriate'' and insert ''essential''. 
Amendment No. 62 is simply a probing amendment, because yet again the provision is so general, stating: 
''The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about . . . the payment, collection and enforcement of charges imposed in accordance with regulations . . . the determination of questions about liability for such charges, about the rate of charge applicable''
and about ''appeals against decisions''. That is quite outrageous. It goes too far and allows the Secretary of State, having imposed whatever charges he wants, to decide how they are to be collected and enforced and all questions of liability or appeal, as well as allowing him to say that someone should pay or he will suspend their licence. How can we debate any of that? Where is it? If it is in this subsection, I have missed it. 
We are being asked to give the Government carte blanche and to give the Secretary of State powers to make by regulation all sorts of decisions of great importance about alcohol disorder zones and the premises therein, which of them will be charged and how much. That is a very poor state of affairs. How can we debate any of it? There is a huge absence of natural justice, and it is hugely penal on a number of premises, yet it appears that we will not properly be able to debate it because of a total absence of proper detail. 
I shall deal briefly with amendment No. 63, which relates to appeals. It states: 
''Regulations made under subsection (9) shall include provision for appeals against decisions determining such questions as set out''.
Does the rest of the Committee agree that that sweeping powers to create an alcohol disorder zone must be subject at some stage to a proper check and balance? There must be a right for a person affected by such a decision by the Government to take the matter further—to say that they want to appeal. There should be a proper, streamlined method. We shall discuss appeals again later, but I make that preliminary point, because I do not, at present, see proper provision in this section for appeals. 
My fundamental point is that we seek from the Minister the clearest of undertakings that businesses that are not in any way culpable or to blame for alcohol disorder in their locality will not be asked to pay any charges. Behind the Minister, a number of her colleagues are nodding in support of what I have said, but the Minister is looking round now, and they have stopped nodding.

Chris Ruane: I was scratching.

Humfrey Malins: The hon. Gentleman says that he was scratching. It is sometimes instructive to look behind you.

Diane Abbott: Is the hon. Gentleman able to tell us of any section of the licensed trade that admits that it contributes substantially to alcohol disorder?

Humfrey Malins: No, I do not—[Interruption.] I say to the hon. Lady, who has a long history in the House of Commons, that the fact that I do not know of a particular section that is prepared to admit that it is at fault does not mean that there are not sections that are at fault. In the same way, one does not often find people who are prepared to admit that they have committed crimes, but one still needs to have them arrested, charged and prosecuted.

Jeremy Wright: If I understand correctly the amendments that my hon. Friend has tabled, he suggests that an alcohol disorder zone can be imposed on an area in its entirety, following a local authority's assessment that it presents a problem. However, the provision does not allow the local authority—or anyone else—to distinguish between the licensed premises that contribute to the problem and those that do not.

Humfrey Malins: My hon. Friend is absolutely right—[Interruption.] I did not hear the intervention made by the hon. Member for Vale of Clwyd (Chris Ruane), but no doubt, with his experience of the world, he will make his own contribution to the debate. We have waited two or three days to hear him speak, and we will look forward to that contribution.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Where is it said in the Bill that those who are at fault will in some way be punished and those who are not at fault will be exempted? That is the point. I do not believe that any House of Commons should give the power to the Minister or to local authorities randomly to impose charges across the board irrespective of questions of guilt or innocence. 
The problem with alcohol disorder zones is that they are indiscriminate in many ways; they are a catch-all, and almost by definition they are unjust. One of those who briefed me makes the point that the principle of alcohol disorder zones is that all premises of a certain type within a designated zone will be affected, rather than focusing on those premises that are at fault. Responsible premises will, or may, therefore suffer. 
It is a fact that an alcohol disorder zone can even be proposed in areas where all proprietors take a responsible attitude. I wonder whether it has occurred to hon. Members—we shall discuss this matter later—that under the Bill, even in an area where every licensed premises is utterly and wholly responsible in its dealings, an alcohol disorder zone can still be imposed. That is provided for in clause 13, which I implore hon. Members to read. That clause permits the imposition of an alcohol disorder zone in an area 
''associated with the consumption of alcohol in that locality or with the consumption of alcohol supplied at premises in that locality.''
That is an absurd situation. Even a particularly innocent town, where nothing wrong has ever happened, could find itself turned into an alcohol disorder zone because people buy drinks elsewhere in the area—outside the town—and come into the town and cause the trouble. That is the direct effect of clause 13. Why impose an alcohol disorder zone, with the consequent charges, on an entirely innocent town, where no one is at fault?

Sally Keeble: In the hypothetical case to which the hon. Gentleman refers, the local authority has other remedies. It can have a byelaw under which the police can go round taking the drink away and pouring it down the gutter. There are plenty of remedies other than the alcohol disorder zone. I do not see why the hon. Gentleman has a problem.

Humfrey Malins: I happen to believe that if a Bill says something, that is what it means. I have had enough of this Government saying that the Bill may say X but they do not intend to enforce it and will proceed in a different way. The Bill says that an alcohol disorder zone can be created in a locality where no one is at fault. If the hon. Lady thinks that the Bill does not say that, she must tell me.

Eric Forth: Order. I think that the Committee is drifting towards clause 13. I ask the hon. Gentleman and the Committee to concentrate on clause 12. We will get on to clause 13 in due course.

Humfrey Malins: I accept what you say absolutely, Mr. Forth. I have made my fundamental point. A number of amendments in this group are designed to protect the innocent and to draw from the Government more details of what they are seeking to do with the clause.

Sammy Wilson: Alcohol disorder zones are an essential part of controlling this sort of behaviour. If we are to have such zones, there must be charges on people and penalties on those who operate within them. I have some sympathy with the point that the hon. Member for Woking made: licensed premises that conduct business well and do not encourage excessive drinking should not be subject to charges. I want some clarification about how it is possible to separate out the responsible premises from the irresponsible premises.
I can think of a number of areas in my constituency where there is a concentration of premises. Binge drinking often involves people moving from one set of premises to another, all of which, individually, may conduct their business in a reasonable and well-ordered fashion. However, the cumulative effect of young people and other drinkers moving from one pub to another, getting increasing levels of alcohol in their bodies, can create difficulties in that area. 
I am trying to be helpful. How does one differentiate between the premises that have caused the problem and those that have not where there is a conglomeration of premises and where many people are attracted into the area for the purpose of having a drink, moving from one place to another and then perhaps engaging in the sort of behaviour that the Bill is designed to tackle? How will a local authority distinguish between those premises? 
As has been pointed out, none of them will admit that they are the source of the problem and, indeed, all of them may be conducting their business in a reasonable way. But it is the cumulative effect of all of those premises together that causes the problem and leads to higher costs for the local authority, for which it will seek to be reimbursed, and leads also to problems for local people. I should be interested to hear how the hon. Member for Woking thinks that one can distinguish between one and the other.

Hazel Blears: If we stick to clause 12 and the charging, I think that the Government have tried to adopt a moderate approach. On the one hand, we are pressed by some people who genuinely want us to deal with alcohol-related disorder and to have a levy on the whole of the industry for the costs of extra policing that binge drinking causes in our communities. Many people are very angry about that and they have pressed me to say, ''If this is such a problem, why do we not have a levy on the whole industry?'' That is not the right approach to take. We have attempted to target the mischief and to bear down on those areas where alcohol misuse causes the community a real problem. We are attempting to establish a framework that targets that mischief, while being as fair as we can be to different premises in that area.
Other people have pressed to have a complete flat-rate charge for all premises in an area. We could have adopted that approach, but we have not done so because it would have been a fairly blunt instrument to use to deal with the problems. Along with my letter to members of 11 October, I circulated as much detail as I could on the proposed framework, how we would be looking at charges for individual premises and how we would be considering the factors that would make up those charges. I also circulated the process by which an alcohol disorder zone can be designated. The idea is that we use that process as a last resort. 
We have an action plan, whereby people get together and come up with solutions to problems before we go down the route of having an alcohol disorder zone, with the necessary charges that flow from that. This is not a case of the Government seeking to tar all premises with the same brush and to have an unfair, broad-brush approach for everyone. 
The purpose of amendment No. 132, which stands in the name of the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green, was to see whether charges could be paid to several local authorities because of the contiguous nature of premises that might be involved. We cannot do that because we must have some boundaries. This is a local authority issue. We have local authority boundaries, and local authorities will have to deal with the premises that are in their area. There is no reason, however, why two neighbouring local authorities could not co-operate and collaborate to designate alcohol disorder zones. Each local authority would still need to make its own decision about designation and about its action plan. The measures in one's action plan could be the same as those for the neighbouring local authority. Indeed, it would probably be appropriate for two neighbouring local authorities to adopt the same measures. I do not think that we can accept the hon. Lady's amendment,  but she makes a genuine point—where premises span two local authority areas, there will need to be collaboration in designating the areas and in drawing up the action plan. 
The purpose of amendment No. 131 was to impose a cap on the amount of charges. The hon. Member for Woking raised the issue of a limit on the charges that the Government or a local authority could impose. The amendment proposed a cap on the level of the compulsory charge set at the monthly equivalent of 3 per cent. of premises' annual rateable value. 
I am thinking carefully about what that level should be. We have been discussing it with various stakeholders, such as the industry and local authorities. We wish to set a meaningful level of charge, which is sufficient to recover the cost of local agencies mounting an effective package of intervention based on local needs. The charge must be enforceable and payable. It should not be set at a level that simply puts people out of business. It should not be too high as to destroy the night-time economy. In many cases, the night-time economy is important. We want to control that economy rather than undermine it.

Lynne Featherstone: Does the Minister accept that there needs to be a cap in the Bill to put to rest the minds of all those establishments that look to this Committee to get some sense of what the cost will be and whether their businesses will survive this legislation?

Hazel Blears: I am prepared to consider the matter further. I cannot give the hon. Lady the undertaking that she looks for at this particular stage. I am mindful of the fact that charges need to be set at a level that enables the police and local authorities to recover the costs of the extra enforcement activity. However, charges should not be set at a level that is so high that it could have almost the reverse effect and push people into economic non-viability. We have often found that it is the premises that are on the edge of viability that cause the most problems, because they do not conduct their businesses in a responsible way. I am mindful of that fact.
I also wish to provide an incentive for people to enter into business improvement district arrangements. We now have seven of those throughout the country. People voluntarily come together and agree to pay extra costs in order to improve the night-time economy and to attract more people into the area because the environment is safer. If I can, through the process of alcohol disorder zones, encourage people to come together voluntarily, that is exactly what I want to do. The alcohol disorder zone process, as I have said time and again, is a last resort. We do not want to enter that territory. However, if it is necessary and people will not get an action plan together or form a business improvement district and take collective responsibility for the problems in our town and city centres, it will be necessary to set up an alcohol disorder zone, and they will have to pay extra charges for the cost of policing and enforcement in the area. I am determined that the problems on our streets and in our towns and city  centres will be tackled effectively. People need to know that there will be a charge at the end of the process. 
The hon. Member for East Antrim (Sammy Wilson) made an important point about how to determine exactly who is the culprit in the relevant circumstances. My hon. Friend the Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott) also made the important point that people are reluctant to own up to conducting their businesses irresponsibly. How do we know where a person had the last alcopop or the last vodka and Red Bull, or what ever it was that sent them over the edge into the kind of violence that is all too often seen on a Friday and Saturday night? 
If an alcohol disorder zone is designated, inevitably tension will arise over who exactly is responsible, However, one of our main reasons for making the proposals is to get people to take collective responsibility for their neighbourhood. The good operators may be able to put pressure on the poorer operators to conform to proper responsible standards in conducting their business. That is why the policy is so important for us. 
Hon. Members asked about sporting clubs and rugby clubs. In some cases clubs are large contributors to the night-time economy. Company clubs, and even Labour clubs and Conservative clubs, may be regular well-established drinking establishments.

Lynne Featherstone: What about Liberal Democrat clubs?

Hazel Blears: I am not aware of any Liberal Democrat clubs. They are perhaps more likely to be temperance clubs; I am not sure.
I shall consider the question of members' clubs, but I do not entirely accept the assertion of the hon. Member for Woking that they are all the most wonderfully well run establishments, with never a hint of any alcohol-related disorder.

Humfrey Malins: I never said that. The Minister keeps attributing to me words that I did not say. Perhaps she can have Hansard read through, to establish that I did not say those words.

Hazel Blears: I think the hon. Gentleman protests too much, on occasion. I think that what he was attempting to say—well, perhaps I should not put words into his mouth; it appeared to me that he was saying that members clubs ought not to be included in the provisions because they could be perfectly respectable and responsible. I have no doubt that many are, but I am not satisfied that every private members club does not contribute to alcohol-related disorder. It is fairly well known that some of the drinking games that take place in rugby clubs can lead to excessive drinking, and the activities that flow from it.
I cannot agree to amendment No. 43, which would hit at the heart of our policy on alcohol disorder zones. It would oblige local authorities to determine whether individual pubs and clubs had directly contributed to the crime and disorder, and offer exemptions or discounts on that basis. That would in effect mean that the local authority would have to establish an  audit trail—the hon. Member for East Antrim has already suggested how difficult that could be—clearly linking inebriated offenders in the public space back to the particular pubs, clubs or off-licences that they frequented. As I pointed out just now, it is difficult to say whether a particular gin and tonic in a given pub at 8 o'clock sent someone over the edge and led to their having a fight in the taxi queue, or that the three pints of lager in another pub contributed to a mêlée at 2 o'clock in the morning. That is not a workable approach, and to suggest it shows a misunderstanding of the policy.

Jeremy Wright: Although we shall come to the matter in a later clause, it is obvious from the scheme of the Bill that the police will have to consent to, and have an input into, the drawing up of an alcohol disorder zone. The Minister will know from her constituency, just as I do from mine, that the police often know where the irresponsible operators are, and where the responsible ones are. Surely their input will assist in answering the question that the hon. Member for East Antrim raised, and which she raises. If it is not addressed, will we not still penalise the pub operators who are doing their level best to address the problem that she describes?

Hazel Blears: The hon. Gentleman is right to say that most police officers will know where the high-risk premises are; but many officers will say to him, as they have said to me, that sometimes it is difficult to determine from where the problems emanate, and establish a clear audit trail. Inevitably, if we draw a line around a designated area, there will be tension in that area between people who are responsible operators and those who are not.
The whole idea is not to end up with an alcohol disorder zone, but to implement an action plan that solves the problem. I am not interested in getting to the position in which everyone is paying their charges. I do not want to accommodate the problem, so that there is an alcohol disorder zone, we pay £100 a week and we carry on behaving appallingly. I want to have an action plan to stop such behaviour. That is why the zone is a last resort. 
There is in our community a sense of collective responsibility for dealing with those problems. Where there are only one or two premises, the police should use their powers under the Licensing Act 2003 to enforce and to close. They have some good new powers in the licensing legislation, which I expect them to use. Equally, the alcohol disorder zone policy will be the incentive that drives people, in an area with a concentration of nightclubs and pubs that cause problems, to get their house in order.

Lynne Featherstone: I have some problems with amendment No. 43. It states that no charge would be payable within the zone if there were no responsibility or contribution. However, as we have said, there is a wider responsibility for the group. Will the Minister provide an assurance in the Bill, not just in the document that she helpfully sent, that there will be no flat charge, and that the good will be rewarded and the bad punished, proportionate to their misbehaviour? The document says that there is a proposal to  differentiate, but it does not say enough to allay the concerns of the people who are lobbying me.

Hazel Blears: I understand the hon. Lady's pressing for a firmer commitment. There will be draft regulations. I have circulated as much information as I can, and it clearly states the Government's intention, and explains our serious effort to ensure that the charge relating to the necessary extra enforcement activity is apportioned. The hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth made the point that there ought to be provision for a higher charge on higher-risk premises.
We should also like to introduce a provision for discounts for people who conduct their premises properly. We are working on an industry code of good practice. When that is established, people who receive accreditation under it may well be eligible for discounts. There is provision in the Bill to develop that idea. 
I hope that Members have a genuine sense that we are not implementing an unfair flat-rate charge against everybody, irrespective of their contribution. We are trying to apportion where we can. Equally, it would be hugely bureaucratic and unworkable to have the sort of scheme envisaged in the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Woking. That would go against our policy in the Bill. 
Amendment No. 36 would add a further category of person who could be subject to the charge, by introducing the tenant or the premises supervisor as well as the licensee. That would be inappropriate, and we are trying to aim our powers at the right people. The people who must be subject to the charge are those who can make the decisions, because we want to influence their behaviour. The licensees will have the biggest stake in the process, and they need to make the decisions. The power must be levelled at them, not at the people with day-to-day responsibilities. 
Opposition amendments Nos. 39 and 40 would change the charges from those that the Secretary of State considers appropriate to those deemed to be essential. I should like to make two points. First, the amendments would deflect local authorities' energies from getting on with the job of dealing with the necessary charging scheme to considering legal definitions. 
Secondly, how would the hon. Gentleman draw the line between helpful and essential charges? What would be the point of excluding helpful actions? How would one allow for funds to instigate innovatory ideas that had not been tested but that one felt could make a difference in an alcohol disorder zone? The hon. Gentleman's amendments are far too restrictive. The use of the word ''appropriate'' is preferable to the harsher test that he proposes. 
Amendment No. 41 would restrict the scope of the regulations that the Secretary of State could make under clause 12, and would remove from the scope of the regulations provisions about payment, collection and enforcement of the charge. We can cover administrative matters in guidance, but we want to set them out in regulations, because we want to give effect to clause 12(10) which provides for 
''the suspension of premises licences and club premises certificates for non payment of a charge.''
These are serious matters that should properly be dealt with in the regulations, not left to the guidance.

Humfrey Malins: There are so many references to regulations. How many of those regulations are available for the Committee to look at, given that the Minister has had months to produce them? It is not satisfactory that they have not been produced, as the Committee must have the chance to debate them.

Hazel Blears: The hon. Gentleman well knows, from my letter of 11 October, that the regulations cannot be provided. In the lengthy and extensive briefing that I provided to all members of the Committee, which I hope they found useful, I tried to give the fullest possible indication—

Humfrey Malins: On a point of order, Mr. Forth. The Government's position is utterly shambolic. We are discussing a critical Bill with critical regulations, but we will see none of them during Committee stage. Is it within your power, Mr. Forth, to adjourn the Committee for a fortnight, or three weeks if necessary, while the Government do the job that they are meant to do, so that we can see the regulations and debate them?

Eric Forth: The hon. Gentleman expresses his understandable frustration through a point of order, but that is not a matter for the Committee to deal with now. The Minister said that she would bring forth the regulations when she could. The Committee is here to consider not the regulations, but the Bill, which I hope we will continue to do.

Hazel Blears: Thank you, Mr. Forth. I shall now deal with—

James Clappison: Can the Minister give us any idea when the regulations might be ready? Will they be ready in time for us to debate them on Report?

Hazel Blears: I am not in a position to give that assurance, but I will endeavour to get a firmer idea of when they will be ready.
Amendments Nos. 62 and 63 relate to clause 12(9)(c), and would strengthen the wording in the Bill, from saying that we may make provision for appeals to saying that we must. I assure hon. Members that we intend to provide the normal administrative checks and balances on local authority charging that apply in other fields. We certainly do not want to set up an elaborate system of tribunals for appeals, but  will endeavour to ensure that the charges for alcohol disorder zones are the same as for other local authority charges, and that there is a system for questioning them. 
Government amendment No. 79 is straightforward and practical. It allows for interest to be charged on overdue payments for alcohol disorder zones, and is another incentive for people to make those payments, in addition to the possibility that their licences could be suspended and/or revoked. 
Liberal Democrat tabled amendment No. 145 seeks that the regulations should be subject to the affirmative procedure. That is not necessary. We can lay the regulations before Parliament and leave it open to Members to pray against them. We will, of course, consider any comments from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee about procedure for the regulations, but we want to proceed using the negative resolution procedure. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green to withdraw her amendment, and for other Members not to press their amendments.

Lynne Featherstone: On this occasion, I will do so. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Amendment proposed: No. 43, in clause 12, page 10, line 23, at end insert 
'provided that no charges shall be paid, or be payable, by any persons or clubs unless the local authority reasonably believes that such persons or clubs by their acts, or omissions, contribute to the incidence of alcohol-related crime or disorder in the locality.'.—[Mr. Malins.] 
Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 3, Noes 13.

Question accordingly negatived. 
Further consideration adjourned.—[Kevin Brennan.] 
Adjourned accordingly at sixteen minutes past Seven o'clock till Thursday 20 October at Nine o'clock.